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“Ends may influence beginnings. In a society where one-half of all new mar-
riages are expected to end in divorce, a radical change in the rules for ending
marriage inevitably affects the rules for marriage itself and the intentions and
expectations of those who enter it.” Leonore Weitzman (1985)
“Marriage is the most important contract, for ourselves and for the wider
world, that most of us will make, yet men and women sign up to it on an
erotic high without mentioning the terms of the contract, still less examining
them.” The Sunday Times (July 11, 2004)
1. Introduction
When a marriage dissolves, a couple usually divides all marital assets accord-
ing to the division rule imposed upon them by the state. However, growth in asset
ownership and marital breakdown has increased demand by married couples to con-
tract out state-imposed rules governing the allocation of marital assets upon divorce.
Pre-marital contracting in Europe is particularly notable in the Netherlands, where
prenuptial agreements are reported to be signed before 25 percent of all marriages
(Smith, 2003). In Norway, contracts are also available to cohabitants. While less
than 20 percent of all cohabitants had signed a contract in 1997, this proportion
was close to 40 percent for cohabiting individuals aged fifty or over (Noack, 2001).
In the United States, approximately 5 percent of marrying couples are reported to
have signed prenuptials, with that number rising to an estimated 20 percent for
remarrying couples (Marston, 1997).
In spite of the increased practical relevance of prenuptial agreements in Europe
and elsewhere, there is still much debate about their role. Advocates of prenuptial
agreements see their advantages in terms of the benefits of certainty and contrac-
tual autonomy in the context of heterogenous marital circumstances. Critics suggest
that prenuptial agreements may increase — rather than decrease — the likelihood
of divorce by requiring couples to consider explicitly the terms of a divorce settle-
ment. Moreover, initiating a prenuptial bargain may send a negative signal that the
initiators expectation of divorce is high (Spier, 1992). The main objection against
prenuptial agreements is the allegation that in a society where ‘power’ is system-
atically distributed asymmetrically, marriage contracts are likely to reinforce such
an asymmetry (McLellan, 1996). In other words, prenuptial contracts may over-
whelmingly hurt one party in the event of a divorce by virtue of his or her inferior
bargaining power at the time of contract-bargaining.
To assess these debates requires an understanding of why a contract that de-
parts significantly from the state-imposed division rules may be jointly preferred
by a couple entering into a marriage relationship. In other words, it is necessary to
identify the source of failure of state-imposed divorce laws that prenuptial agree-
ments will remedy. This paper puts forward a case for marriage contracts, arguing
that greater investments in relationship-specific assets would be made as a result.
To analyze this issue we develop a model of marriage in which a married (or
cohabiting) couple makes three decisions. In the first stage, the two partners deter-
2
mine and negotiate the terms of divorce and stipulate them in a contract in which
they agree on the division of the marital assets upon divorce. In the second stage,
each partner undertakes a relationship-specific investment that enhances the value
of the said assets.1 Finally, in the third stage, the couple bargain over the partition
of the marital surplus generated from their investments in the shadow of divorce.
A key feature of the model is that the partners are unable to contract upon
the investments they make in the assets (due to various factors such as that such
investments are not verifiable by “third parties”). The investments that we have in
mind may also be multidimensional in nature. They may not just be dollar amounts
(e.g., cost of renovations), but also stand for decisions to exert effort towards the
household’s assets (e.g., DIY, maintenance), and contributions made by each spouse
towards the acquisition of the family asset by performing domestic duties, thereby
releasing their partners for gainful employment. Since these investments are not
part of any marital contract, there remains scope for the couple to bargain ex post
over the division of the surplus generated from their investments. The terms of
divorce determine the parties’ outside option payoffs. Therefore, they will have
an impact on the relative bargaining powers of the partners within marriage, and
hence affect the distribution of the marital surplus. This, in turn, influences the
partners’ marginal returns on investments, and thus their incentives to invest in
the relationship in the first place. Hence the terms of divorce may have efficiency
consequences as well as having distributive consequences.
Our analysis highlights that the various asset division regimes currently dis-
cussed by policy-makers (which we refer to in more detail below) would in general
lead to inefficient investments in marital specific assets. Precisely because this un-
derinvestment would reduce the gains from marriage, we model the terms of divorce
as being decided at the outset of marriage, as part of an ex ante “separation” agree-
ment that stipulates the division of marital assets in the event of a divorce. We
obtain three main sets of results.
First, we derive and study the optimal asset division rule, one that maximizes
the actual gains from marriage. Two sets of parameters in our model are central to
the determination of the optimal division rule. The first is given by the preference
parameters that capture the partners’ respective valuations of the household asset
in both marital states (i.e, ‘married’ and ‘divorced’). The second set is represented
by the technological parameters that capture the productivities of each partner’s
relationship-specific investment. In general, the optimal division rule is a non-trivial
function of both preference and technology parameters. We show that, in a broad
range of cases, the spouse that has a higher valuation of the household asset in
1Our analysis is carried out as though investments enhance the marketable value of the marital
assets. As we explain below, such investments may involve time, effort, and financial inputs. Yet,
in practice, there are other important aspects of marital investments not dealt with here. For
example, some spouse may sacrifice himself or herself to enhance the “entire value of marriage”
(i.e., the utility derived from being a happy family) which will be sustained and consumed only
if the relationship remains intact, whereas if it does not work out then the value generated from
this investment dissappears and hence does not have a market (or “salvage”) value.
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the divorce state should optimally have a smaller share of the couple’s assets. This
proposition leads to a key insight, namely that the optimal allocation of property
rights over marital assets should be governed by the principle to equalize the parties’
bargaining powers within marriage in order to counter rent-seeking opportunism.
This is consistent with the aim of inducing both parties to provide the optimal level
of relationship-specific investment.
Second, we address the question of whether, or under what circumstances, will
two partners agree in equilibrium to write a prenuptial contract with the optimal
asset division rule. In doing so, we consider an environment in which laws governing
the division of assets on divorce set the default rules within the shadow of which a
prenuptial contract may (or may not) emerge. A key insight we obtain is that, for
any given couple, the incentive to write a prenuptial contract is a function of these
rules. In particular, we show that the greater the “difference” between the optimal
asset division rule and the default rule, the more likely it is that prenuptial contracts
will be agreed upon. Moreover, we show that some degree of heterogeneity in the
partners’ preferences is conducive for an inefficient default rule to be replaced by a
negotiated asset division rule.
Finally, we apply our results to evaluate various currently used default asset
division rules. Such division rules include (i) the ‘equal division of property’; (ii)
the ‘compensation approach’; and (iii) the ‘needs approach’ (see Tee 2001). Our
findings suggest that each of these devices may have drawbacks: because different
legal rules give various amounts of bargaining “chips” to the spouses, changing the
standard would affect each party’s bargaining strength and would therefore distort
decisions and outcomes within marriage away from the first-best. Assessing the
incentive effect of each approach, two robust results emerge. First, we show that
the increasing opportunities of women outside marriage, which can be seen as an
indication of women’s greater bargaining power within it, should be accompanied
by the demise of female presumption in property disputes and by legal changes
towards “equal splits” in divorce settlements. Second, when women almost entirely
specialize in domestic work, and as a consequence have low bargaining powers,
then divorce settlements should favor female partners, thereby leaving them one
instrument of power which they have not signed away.
Our analysis builds upon the property rights approach as pioneered by Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)2, but it is also related to the increas-
ing number of studies that explore the implications of the inability of household
members to “commit across time” — inability which typically leads to inefficient
household resource allocations. Recent family models which have the feature of
constraint efficiency include Konrad and Lommerud (2000), Lundberg and Pollak
(2001), and Rasul (2001).3 The paper closest in spirit to ours is Aura (2003), who
2See de Meza and Lockwood (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), No¨ldeke and Schmidt (2000),
and Besley and Ghatak (2001) for recent contributions that extend their work.
3For a comprehensive survey of the relevant work in this area see Lundberg (2002).
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studies how divorce rules can have an effect on savings for intact families.4 The
common feature of these models is that they set aside the ruling tradition in family
economics that households are able to reach efficient outcomes.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section,
we lay out the model. The main results are presented and discussed in Section 3.
In Section 4, we consider an applications of our analysis, with special emphasis on
the ongoing discussion among policy makers as to appropriate role and extent of
the marital property laws. Section 5 concludes. All technical proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. The Framework. There are two family members, a husband h and a wife
w. The two partners interact over three “dates”. At date 1, the couple determine
how a single family asset is to be split if they divorce each other at date 3.6 Denote
by pi (pi ∈ [0, 1]) the share of the asset that goes to h; hence 1 − pi denotes w’s
share. At date 2, each agent simultaneously and noncooperatively undertakes an
investment which enhances the value of the said asset. Let Ih ≥ 0 and Iw ≥ 0
denote the level of the investments undertaken, where the cost of investing Ii is Ii.
The investments are “sunk” once they have been made, and are entirely embodied
in the household asset. The value of the asset depends on the investment levels and
is denoted V (Ih, Iw). We assume that V (Ih, Iw) is strictly increasing in each of its
arguments, strictly concave, smooth, and satisfies the Inada endpoint conditions.
At date 3, the couple bargain over whether or not to continue to remain married
and over the partition of the marital surplus generated from their investments. We
use the Nash bargaining solution to describe the outcome of these negotiations.
The utility payoffs to h and w if they negotiate an agreement at date 3 over the
division of the marital surplus are respectively
uh = γhV (Ih, Iw)− T and uw = γwV (Ih, Iw) + T, (1)
where T denotes an inter-spousal transfer of utility, which can be positive (if the
transfer is from h to w) or negative (if the opposite is true). The parameter γi > 0 is
a preference parameter that captures the degree/extent to which party i (i = h, w)
derives utility from the household asset in the regime (or state) in which couples
are (happily) married.
4Relatedly, Rasul (2003) and Francesconi and Muthoo (2004) also apply the incomplete-
contract approach to the allocation of property rights to consider how custodial rights matter
for investments in child quality.
5For example, the “unitary approach” (Becker, 1991), the “collective approach” (Chiappori
1992; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix 2002) and Nash bargaining models of the family (Manser
and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981) work with the assumption that families are able to
reach efficient outcomes.
6The procedure through which this is done is discussed in section 3.
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The payoffs to the husband and the wife respectively from divorce are
dh = µhpiV (Ih, Iw), (2)
dw = µw(1− pi)V (Ih, Iw), (3)
where µi > 0 denotes the degree to which party i derives utility from the asset in
the regime in which couples are divorced. We assume that the degree to which each
party derives utility from the household asset is higher in the married state than in
the divorce state, i.e.:
Assumption 1. γi ≥ µi for each i = h, w.
It is assumed that the above three-stage game is one with complete information.
In particular, the values of all the parameters (such as each party’s preference
parameters) are common knowledge between the two spouses. We now characterize
the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of our three-stage game using the
backwards induction procedure.
2.2. The Bargaining Outcome. Suppose that, at date 1, the spouses negotiate a
pre-nuptial contract that specifies an allocation of property rights over the household
asset upon divorce, as captured by an arbitrary value of pi. And furthermore, let
(Ih, Iw) denote an arbitrary pair of investments undertaken at date 2. Then, since
(by Assumption 1)
(γh + γw)V (Ih, Iw) > [µhpi + µw(1− pi)]V (Ih, Iw),
a marital surplus exists at date 3. Hence, at date 3, it is mutually beneficial (Pareto-
efficient) for the couple to agree to remain married and strike an agreement on how
to allocate the marital surplus.7 Applying the Nash Bargaining solution with the
divorce payoffs as the threat point, it is easy to show that the Nash bargained payoff
to party i (i = h, w) is:
uNi = θiV (Ii, Ij), where (4)
θh =
[
γh + γw + µhpi − µw(1− pi)
2
]
, and (5)
θw =
[
γh + γw − µhpi + µw(1− pi)
2
]
. (6)
Notice that i’s (i = h, w) payoff is a fraction θi/ (γh + γw) of the gross marital
surplus (γh + γw)V (Ih, Iw). Thus, θi defines i’s bargaining power. Notice that
the husbands’s bargaining power θh is increasing in pi, while the wife’s bargaining
powers θw is decreasing in pi.
7Because the divorce payoffs are not affected by exogenous shocks, divorce is ruled out in
equilibrium. However, our main point that the allocation of marital property rights on divorce
can have incentive effects by influencing intra-household power relations remains valid even in the
presence of divorce occuring on the equilibrium path.
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2.3. Equilibrium Investments. The first-best levels of investments
(
IEh , I
E
w
)
maximize aggregate marital net surplus:
(IEh , I
E
w ) ∈ argmax
Ih,Iw
S ≡ (γh + γw)V (Ih, Iw)− Ih − Iw. (7)
Thus, the first-best investment levels IEh and I
E
w are the unique solutions to the first
order conditions
(γh + γw)Vh(Ih, Iw) = 1 (8)
(γh + γw)Vw(Ih, Iw) = 1, (9)
where Vi is the first-order derivative with respect to Ii (i = h, w). The left-hand
sides in (8) and (9) represent the parties’ respective social marginal returns from
investing, while the right-hand sides the private marginal costs.
The equilibrium investments Ih and Iw are chosen at date 2 to maximize
uNh − Ih and uNw − Iw, respectively. We denote the Nash equilibrium investments
chosen by h and w by I∗h and I
∗
w, respectively. Given our assumptions, (I
∗
h, I
∗
w) are
the unique solution to the following first-order conditions:
θhVh(Ih, Iw) = 1, (10)
θwVw(Ih, Iw) = 1. (11)
Notice that (since θi depends on pi) I
∗
i depends on the allocation of property rights,
pi, which is determined at date 1. The left-hand sides in (10) and (11) represent the
private marginal returns from investing, while the right-hand sides are the private
marginal costs. Since the private marginal benefits of an investment in (10) and
(11) are less than the social marginal benefits in (8) and (9), it thus follows that
each player underinvests relative to the first-best:
Lemma 1 The equilibrium investment levels are strictly less than the corresponding
first-best investment levels.
Since I∗h and I
∗
w depend on pi, it is clear that in general pi will be crucial in deter-
mining the size and direction of the investment distortions. To investigate exactly
how pi matters, we totally differentiate (10) and (11) with respect to pi and find that
∂I∗h
∂pi
=
1
∆
[
∂θh
∂pi
(
−VhwVw
θw
− VwwVh
θh
)]
and (12)
∂I∗w
∂pi
=
1
∆
[
∂θw
∂pi
(
−VwhVh
θh
− VhhVw
θw
)]
, (13)
where ∆ = [VhhVww − (Vhw)2].8 Equations (12) and (13) can be interpreted as
follows. First, in the case where the investments are (weak) substitutes (i.e., when
8Note that all derivatives of V (the two first-order derivatives Vh and Vw, and the four second-
order derivatives Vhh, Vww, Vhw and Vwh) are evaluated at Ih = I
∗
h and Iw = I
∗
w.
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Vij ≤ 0), factors affecting the spouses’ equilibrium bargaining shares as of date 3
(namely, θh and θw) will affect their investment incentives at date 2 in the same way.
To be precise, any change in ex ante ownership rights (pi) that reduces (raises) an
individual’s share of marital surplus at date 3, will lead to lower (higher) investment
incentives at date 2.9 Second, in the case where the investments are complements
(i.e., when Vij > 0) the impact of a change in ownership rights on investment
incentives will depend upon the relative importance of the investments (and we
shall be more specific about this below).
3. Prenuptial Contracts
We now turn attention to the main issue of concern, namely, the study of the
determination of the allocation pi of property rights over the marital asset (which
is determined at date 1). We begin, in section 3.1., by analyzing the optimal (or
efficient) asset division rule, one that maximizes the spouses’ aggregate welfare and
provides them with best investment incentives. We then, in section 3.2., discuss the
conditions under which the spouses would agree (in equilibrium) to put the optimal
asset division rule in a prenuptial contract.
3.1 Optimal Prenuptial Contracts. The optimal asset division rule is the value
of pi over the interval [0, 1] that maximizes the joint net marital surplus
S∗(pi) ≡ (θh + θw)V (I∗h, I∗w)− I∗h − I∗w, (14)
where θh and θw are defined in (5) and (6) (and depend on pi), and I
∗
h and I
∗
w are
characterized by (10) and (11) (and also depend on pi). After differentiating S∗ (pi)
with respect to pi, it follows that the optimal asset division rule, denoted pi∗, is
implicitly characterized by the first-order condition:
θ3w
(
Vh
Vhh
)
− θ3h
(
Vw
Vww
)
= 0, (15)
where the derivatives Vi and Vii (i = h, w) are evaluated at the equilibrium invest-
ment levels, I∗h and I
∗
w. Since the expression in (15) is still rather intricate, not much
can be said about pi∗ without imposing further restrictions on the function V (·).
To proceed in a tractable manner, we derive a number of results about pi∗ using
various functional forms for the production function V (·). In discussing our results,
we will make reference to the following properties that the production function may
satisfy. Investments are said to be independent when Vhw = 0. If, on the other
hand, a larger investment by the male partner increases the marginal return of the
investment of the female partner (and vice versa), then investments are said to be
complements, i.e., Vhw > 0.
9In fact, since V is assumed to be strictly concave, we have that Vhh < 0, Vww < 0 and ∆ > 0,
and since V is strictly increasing Vh > 0 and Vw > 0. Then, ∂θh/∂pi > 0 and ∂θw/∂pi < 0 implies
that the sign of ∂I∗i /∂pi equals the sign of ∂θi/∂pi.
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3.1.2 Complementary Investments. We consider the class of functions of the Cobb-
Douglas type, namely V (Ih, Iw) = (Ih)
αh (Iw)
αw where 0 < αi < 1 and αh+αw < 1.
These function are smooth, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. Moreover, since
Vij > 0, the investments are complements. The parameters αh and αw capture the
spouses’ productivities. The ratio αi/αj is a measure of productive heterogeneity
between the two spouses. Our main objective is to analyze the impact of these
parameters (as well as the impact of the parties’ preference parameters) on the
optimal allocation of marital property rights. To offer a significant benchmark for
our discussion, the following proposition characterizes the optimal pi for the case
where the two parties are identical in productive terms, i.e., αh = αw:
Proposition 1 Assume that V (Ih, Iw) = (Ih)
α (Iw)
α where 0 < α < 0.5. Then
the optimal allocation of property rights over the marital asset is pih = pi
∗ and
piw = 1− pi∗, where
pi∗ =
µw
µw + µh
. (16)
This result says that the spouses’ relative valuations of the asset following a divorce
— i.e., the degree/extent to which each party derives utility from the asset in the
regime in which couples are separated through divorce — determines the optimal
shares of the asset: the spouse that has the higher “divorce valuation” should
optimally have a smaller share of the asset.
The fact that the optimal marriage contract disadvantages the high valuation
party is a particularly interesting result which yields the following key insight: the
optimal value pi∗ from Proposition 1 is the unique value of pi such that θh = θw,
i.e., it is the unique contractual arrangement that ensures that the spouses’ payoffs
from divorce are equalized, that the power relations within marriage are “harmo-
nized”, and that net surplus is split equally. As a consequence, the spouses cannot
make strategic use of their threat points (i.e., their divorce payoffs) in bargaining
situations they encounter throughout their marriage. Both parties are thus willing
to invest optimally because neither fears expropriation by the other party. Thus
the optimal contract design defines a particular game between the partners, one
in which the ability of individuals to engage in rent-seeking behavior is minimized.
In summary, the terms of the optimal prenuptial agreement prevent the parties
from behaving opportunistically ex post, thereby promoting efficient second-best
investments ex ante.
Returning to the case of productive heterogeneity between the spouses, now
consider the case in which αh 6= αw. We establish that:
Proposition 2 Assume that V (Ih, Iw) = (Ih)
αh (Iw)
αw where 0 < αi < 1 and
αh + αw < 1. Then the optimal allocation of property rights over the marital asset
is pih = pi
∗ and piw = 1− pi∗, where
pi∗ =
µw
µw + µh
+ φ
(
τh − τw
τh + τw
)
, (17)
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where τ i ≡
√
αi
1−αiand φ ≡
γh+γw
µh+µw
.
We know that as far as the objective to balance the bargaining strengths of the
parties is concerned, the first term in (17) rules out opportunistic expropriation by
either party by offsetting marital bargaining powers. The second term, on the other
hand, relaxes the objective to harmonize the spouses’ ex ante bargaining powers
by adjusting for the relative importance of the investments. In fact, if spouse i’s
investment is more productive compared to that of spouse j (i.e., when αi > αj ,
implying, in turn, that τ i > τ j), then spouse i obtains additional property rights
in excess of the first term. As a consequence, the spouses equilibrium shares of
the gross marital surplus will reflect the relative productivity of their respective
investments, but not the parties’ respective threat points (i.e., divorce payoffs). To
see this, substitute the optimal value pi∗ from Proposition 2 into (5) and (6) to
obtain
θ∗i =
τ i
(
γi + γj
)
τ i + τ j
.
The intuition for this follows from the fact that when spouse i’s investment is more
productive than j’s, then the second term of the optimal value pi∗ translates into a
greater bargaining strength of i compared to j, which (s)he will use to obtain a larger
share of the marital surplus. This will cause i’s investment incentives to increase,
and j’s incentives to decrease, so that I∗i > I
∗
j . Ultimately the optimal value pi
∗
from Proposition 2 ensures — by weighting the marginal returns to investing of
both spouses and balancing out marital bargaining powers — that the sum of their
contributions, and thus marital surplus, is maximized.
3.1.2 Independent Investments. Consider now the case in which the investment
by one party does not affect the marginal return of the other party’s investment.
Without loss of generality, we assume that V (Ih, Iw) = αhI
η
h +αwI
η
w where 0 < η <
1. The parameters αh and αw represent productivity parameters. The difference
|αi − αj | is a measure of productive heterogeneity between the two spouses. The
parameter η captures the elasticity of investments Ih and Iw, respectively.
Proposition 3 Assume that V (Ih, Iw) = αhI
η
h + αwI
η
w where η ∈ (0, 1). Then
the optimal allocation of property rights over the marital asset is characterized as
follows.
(a) If η < 2
3
, then the optimal allocation is pih = pi
∗ and piw = 1− pi∗, where
pi∗ =
µw
µw + µh
+ φ
(
τ̂h − τ̂w
τ̂h + τ̂w
)
, where τ̂ i ≡ α
1
2−3η
i .
(b) If η > 2
3
, then sole ownership [either h-ownership or w-ownership] is the optimal
separation agreement.
(c) If η = 2
3
, then any pi ∈ [0, 1] is optimal.
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The intuition for the above results are as follows. For inelastic investment, η < 2/3,
it is important that both parties invest at a medium level rather than one very
high and the other very low. This is guaranteed by the allocation of property
rights as captured by pi∗ in part (a) of Proposition 3: the optimal marriage contract
thus depends on the preference parameters that capture the spouses’ respective
valuation of the asset after divorce, and the technological parameters that capture
the productivities of each parties’ investment. The intuition for this finding has
already been laid out in the preceding discussion of Proposition 2.
Part (b) of Proposition 3 suggests that sole ownership by one party may be
desirable, at least if investments are sufficiently sensitive to surplus shares. In this
case, it is no longer important to equalize the bargaining powers of the parties in-
volved (and to adjust for the relative importance of the investments). The emphasis
is rather on maximizing the investment incentive of the spouse that has the highest
marginal return on investment. Consider first the case in which the parties have
identical investment productivities, i.e., αh = αw. Then it is optimal to maximize
the bargaining power of the spouse that has a higher divorce valuation, µi, by mak-
ing him or her the single owner of the household asset. Indeed, for sufficiently elastic
investment, the marginal return on the high valuation party’s investment (which,
in turn, determines his or her incentives to invest in the first place) is large enough
to offset the disincentive effect caused to the low valuation party by not granting
her any property rights.
Consider next the case of productive heterogeneity between the spouses, i.e.,
αh 6= αw. In this setting, the optimal contractual structure is determined by the
difference in divorce valuations, µi − µj, relative to the difference in investment
productivities, αi−αj . If αi−αj > 0, then sole ownership by the more productive i
generates the highest possible level of aggregate surplus, at least if either µi−µj > 0
(i.e., the more productive party is also the high valuation party), or if µi is not
significantly lower then µj. This result is similar in spirit to the seminal work of
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) on property rights in the
theory of the firm: control by the more productive party is more desirable because
her ex ante incentives to commit resources to the common enterprise are more
important, while the disincentives caused to the less productive (but possibly more
caring) party are a less severe problem. However, even if we allow for αi − αj > 0,
if µj is sufficiently higher then µi, then sole ownership by the more caring j would
dominate sole ownership by the more productive i. The intuition is simple and
follows from the fact that the investment incentives of the more caring, but less
productive, party outweighed the incentives of the more productive spouse once the
ratio
µj−µi
αi−αj exceeds a certain threshold. This is despite the adverse economic effects
of reducing the incentives of the party whose input is relatively more important.
3.2. Equilibrium Prenuptial Contracts. The above analysis concerns the
optimal asset division rule that, once in place, will maximize the joint surplus from
marriage. But it is silent on the question of whether, or under what circumstances,
will the spouses agree in equilibrium to write a prenuptial contract with this asset
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division rule. We now turn attention to this issue.
At the beginning of their relationship (date 1), the couple has the opportunity to
negotiate a (legally enforceable) contract governing post-divorce asset entitlements.
These negotiations are conducted in the shadow of a status quo or default asset
division rule, which is determined by laws governing the division of assets on divorce.
Let the legal (default) shares to h and w be denoted by pi0h = pi
0 (pi0 ∈ [0, 1]) and
pi0w = 1 − pi0 respectively. This initial legal position would generate a (default)
payoff to each party from the relationship. Using backwards induction, it is easy to
verify that the payoff to party i if the status quo remains in place is given by
u0i = θ
0
iV
(
I0h, I
0
w
)− I0i ,
where i’s share of the marital surplus θ0i is as in (5) and (6), but with pi replaced
by the legal norm pi0. Similarly, I0i is determined as in (8) and (9), but with θi
replaced by θ0i (and hence depends on pi
0). A basic assumption is that this status
quo is inefficient (i.e., pi0 6= pi∗). Will our two parties agree, in equilibrium, to write
a contract that departs from this inefficient status quo?
3.2.1 Coasian Contract Negotiations. Suppose that the assumptions underlying
the date 1 bargaining game are as follows. First, the game is one with complete
information, i.e., all the parameters of the model are common knowledge between
the players. Second, the spouses can bargain at little or no cost. Third, side
payments between spouses are feasible. In other words, each party has enough funds
to be able to make an up-front side payment to secure a negotiated agreement.10
Such a (frictionless) environment has often been described as a “Coasian” world.
An application of Coase’s Theorem would thus imply that in the absence of
frictions, the parties would negotiate to implement the optimal (efficient) asset
division rule. In doing so, one party would in general need to offer the other party
(or, as the case may be, demand from her) a side payment in return for agreeing
to implement the optimal contract (Coase, 1960). This conclusion can be explicitly
derived as the unique equilibrium of our model in which the two parties Nash
bargain at date 1 over the value of pi ∈ [0, 1] and the level of a side payment s ∈ R,
with the disagreement point (u0h, u
0
w). Indeed, in the absence of frictions, one can
establish that the equilibrium asset division rule is the optimal one, and that the
Nash bargained side-payment is
s∗ =
(u∗h − u0h)− (u∗w − u0w)
2
,
where u∗i denotes i’s payoff from the relationship when pi = pi
∗. Thus the side
payment will be instigated by the party whose incentives (or net benefit) from im-
plementing the optimal asset division rule is relatively higher.11 The exact level of
10Or, alternatively, each party is able to make binding commitments about such a payment
during marriage.
11Of course, the possibility of making side payments ensures that the parties will not let the
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the side payment depends on the amount by which his or her net benefit exceeds
that of the other party. What needs to be emphasized, therefore, is that different
legal rules (as captured by different values of pi0) will inevitably lead to different
distributional outcomes. However, the ultimate result of Coasian contract nego-
tiations (which is a contract on the optimal, or efficient, outcome) is completely
unaffected by the initial legal position.
3.2.2 The Impossibility of Coasian Contract Negotiations. We now consider the (not
uncommon) scenario in which couples cannot (or are unable to) make up-front side-
payments.12 We therefore reverse the Coasian set-up discussed above, and consider
what would happen if no party can offer the other party (or demand from her) some
side payment in return for agreeing to write a prenuptial contract.
We begin the study of this scenario by addressing the question of whether the
spouses will agree to write a contract with the optimal asset division rule pi∗ or will
choose to stick with the legal norm pi0 (because one of the parties prefers to do
so). In order to illustrate our main insights in a simplified manner, we analyze the
special case in which V = I
1/3
h I
1/3
w (i.e., the case in which the parties are identical in
productive terms). As can bee seen from Proposition 1, the optimal asset division
rule in this case would be pi∗ = µw/ (µh + µw). The following proposition states our
results, which are illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed after their statement:
Proposition 4 Define the following critical values:
pˆi0h ≡
2µw +
(√
5− 1) (γh + γw)
2 (µh + µw)
and pˆi0w ≡
2µw −
(√
5− 1) (γh + γw)
2 (µh + µw)
.
(a) If either pˆi0h < pi
0 ≤ 1, or 0 ≤ pi0 < pˆi0w then both parties would agree to write a
prenuptial contract with the optimal asset division rule pi∗.
(b) Otherwise — i.e, if either pi∗ ≤ pi0 ≤ pˆi0h, or pi∗ ≥ pi0 ≥ pˆi0w — then the inefficient
status quo pi0 would remain in place.
Figure 1 depicts these results.13 It plots the value of the default rule pi0 against
the ratio of divorce valuations, µh/µw, to illustrate under what type of default rules
problem of the division of the gains from marital contracting stand in the way of contracting on
the optimal asset division rule (Coase, 1960). Note that the side payment will be arranged in such
a way so as to “split the difference”, i.e., so that each party receives a utility payoff that equals
his or her disagreement payoff u0i plus one-half of the gains from marital contracting.
12This scenario may occur for several reasons. Here we mention three. First, individuals about
to marry may be unwilling to use “bribes” to secure a prenuptial bargain (even if they have the
resources to do so). Second, individuals about to marry may be unable to borrow the (potentially
large) amounts of money required to make compensating side-payments. Third, binding commit-
ments about future actions that would induce the parties to come to the negotiating table are in
general outside the scope of marriage contracts (see, for example, Smith 2003).
13Notice that “w-veto” means that pi0 stays in place in the relevant region because the wife
prefers pi0 over pi∗; similarly, “h-veto” means that pi0 stays in place in the relevant region because
the husband prefers pi0 over pi∗. Also note that the figure is based on using γi = µi (i = h,w),
and that the limit of pˆi0h as µh/µw →∞ equals (
√
5− 1)/2.
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Figure 1: An Illustration of Proposition 4.
and for what type of couples prenuptial contracts will be most endemic. The two
main messages are as follows:
First, notice that for any given couple, the incentive to write a marriage contract
is a function of the default asset division rule pi0. In particular, the greater the
difference between pi∗ and pi0 the more likely it is that a prenuptial contract with
the optimal division rule would be agreed to. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. Consider an initial situation in which pi0 > pi∗, i.e., the case in which the
default rule pi0 advantages the husband h and disadvantages the wife w compared
to the optimal pi∗ (opposite points hold for the symmetric case in which pi0 < pi∗).
In these circumstances, the wife would always have an incentive to get rid of the
inefficient status quo and benefit from an efficiency-enhancing change from pi0 to
pi∗. This is exactly because both the level of the marital surplus and the wife’s ex
post bargaining power (and thus her share of that surplus) would increase after a
change from pi0 to pi∗. However, the husband knows that an agreement on pi∗ would
destroy his ex post bargaining power advantage, and thus may have an incentive
to refuse to consent to a contract with pi∗. Indeed, when the difference between
pi∗ and pi0 is positive but small, then h has a vested interest in maintaining the
inefficient division rule pi0 that underlies the inefficient status quo. This is precisely
because the efficiency gains associated with a change from pi∗ to pi0 would be too
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small to offset h’s loss of bargaining power. To put it more generally, the smaller
the difference between pi∗ and pi0, the smaller are the efficiency gains associated with
a change from pi∗ to pi0 and the less likely it is that the party advantaged in the
status quo would consent to such a change taking place. On the other hand, when
the difference between pi∗ and pi0 is sufficiently large, then the male partner would
no longer refuse to consent to a contract with pi∗ since, on net, his loss of bargaining
power is more than offset by the efficiency gains that an agreement on pi∗ would
produce. A central message of the above analysis can therefore be put as follows:
even with a large bargaining power advantage for one party in the status quo, which
does get lost if a contract with pi∗ is agreed, if there are enough of efficiency gains
from a change to pi∗ to redistribute during marriage, the party will agree to write a
contract with the optimal asset division rule.
Second, the set of default rules under which the inefficient status quo would be
replaced by the optimal pi∗ gradually vanishes as the ratio µh/µw approaches one. If
µh and µw are sufficiently close to each other, then the inefficient status quo remains
in place regardless of the value of pi0. Thus some degree of inequality in the parties’
divorce valuations is necessary for the inefficient status quo to be replaced by the
optimal asset division rule pi∗. The intuition behind this result comes from noting
that the larger the degree of inequality in the party’s divorce valuations (given an
arbitrary value of pi0), the larger are the efficiency gains associated with a change
from pi0 to pi∗, and thus the more likely it is that such a change will take place.
The above analysis concerns the choice between pi∗ and pi0. We now briefly
consider the situation in which the couple actually bargain over an arbitrary division
rule pi ∈ [0, 1] with the disagreement point (u0h, u0w).14
We don’t propose, in this paper, to explicitly characterize the result of such
negotiations. Instead we report the results of a simulation that reveals a few inter-
esting properties of the Nash bargained outcome. The results of the simulation in
question are stated in Table 1.15 The results of this simulation suggest the following
sets of insights:
First, there exist critical values pi0h and pi
0
w (pi
0
h > pi
0
w) such that for values of pi
0
over the intervals [0, pi0w) and (pi
0
h, 1] the couple would agree to write a prenuptial
contract to replace the inefficient legal norm. The division rule that the couple
would negotiate — we denote this agreement by pic — is systematically pegged to
the legal norm pi0. The key insight contained here is that the equilibrium negotiated
agreement does not correspond to the optimal asset division rule pi∗ (which equals
14This means that the equilibrium negotiated asset division rule, denoted pic, is the unique
solution to
max
pi
[
uNh (pi)− u0h
] [
uNw (pi)− u0w
]
,
where u0i is i’s payoff from the relationship when pi = pi
0 and ui (pi) denotes i’s payoff from the
relationship for any arbitrary pi ∈ [0, 1] .
15This simulation is based on using V = I
1/3
h I
1/3
w , γh = γw = 4 and µh = µw = 4. As can be
seen from Proposition 1, the optimal asset division rule in this case would be pi∗ = 0.5. Notice
that uci (i = h,w) denotes i’s payoff from the relationship when pi = pi
c.
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pi0 0 .06 .12 .18 .49 .51 .82 .88 .94 1
pic .228 .205 .183 w-veto w-veto h-veto h-veto .817 .795 .772
uch 3.196 3.051 2.912 w-veto w-veto h-veto h-veto 5.616 5.605 5.584
u0h 1.777 2.141 2.515 2.894 4.693 4.788 5.617 5.598 5.505 5.333
ucw 5.584 5.605 5.616 w-veto w-veto h-veto h-veto 2.912 3.051 3.196
u0w 5.333 5.505 5.598 5.617 4.788 4.693 2.894 2.515 2.141 1.777
Table 1: Results of a Simulation.
0.5 in the context of the parameters used for this simulation). For any pi0 > pi∗, the
equilibrium negotiated agreement pic would lie in the interval (pi∗, pi0). Similarly,
for any pi0 < pi∗, the equilibrium negotiated agreement pic would lie in the inter-
val (pi0, pi∗). This makes intuitive sense: the legal norm used in a society confers
bargaining power in contract negotiations via its impact on the disagreement point.
Second, for values of pi0 over the interval [pi0w, pi
0
h] the couple would fail to reach an
agreement. This is exactly because the efficiency gains associated with the contract
that the couple would negotiate are small, and the party with a bargaining power
advantage in the status quo has a vested interest in maintaining the inefficient legal
norm pi0.
Although the above analysis does not offer an analytical characterization of the
equilibrium when the two partners actually bargain over the asset division rule,
it is conceivable that the insights we obtain are robust to a general and complete
characterization of these negotiations.
Are there pointers for policy? When up-front side payments are beyond the
scope of marital contracting, we have shown above that there is a close and deep
connection between legal norms regulating the division of marital assets upon di-
vorce and a couple’s incentives to write prenuptial contracts. The immediate, main
policy consequences are thus self-evident: although privately negotiated marital
contracts can provide incentives for greater relationship-specific investment, indi-
viduals about to marry may be unwilling to discuss the possibility of making an
efficiency-enhancing private contract for fear that the contract may imperil the ex-
isting status quo. In such circumstances, legal norms governing divorce continue
to directly influence the economic incentives of married couples. It would therefore
seem desirable that policy-makers should understand the efficiency consequences
of their decisions and should therefore take these consequences into account when
making their decisions.
4. An Application: Property Law for Divorcing Couples
The application that inspired this analysis is the ongoing debate among policy
makers as to the appropriate role and extent of marital property laws. There are
several polar legal structures currently considered by policy makers for handling
the problem of property divorce settlements. The three most commonly discussed
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are: (1) the ‘equal division of property model’; (2) the ‘needs model’; and (3) the
‘compensation model’.
Each of these three assignments of property rights creates its own set of bargain-
ing endowments. Because different legal rules give various amounts of “bargaining
chips” (in the language coined by Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979) to spouses,
changing the standard would affect each party’s bargaining strength and would
therefore influence decisions and outcomes within marriage. In this section, we
provide a comparative evaluation of the efficiency properties of the aforementioned
legal structures.
We develop our ideas in this section in a slightly different framework — one in
which the question faced by courts is how to weight domestic endeavour (i.e., home
production) against the grind of wage-earning in divorce settlements. We explicitly
think of the investments Ih and Iw as contributions made by each spouse towards
the acquisition of the family asset by performing domestic duties, thereby releasing
one’s partner for gainful employment. Intuitively, when one spouse specializes at
home, the cost of such an investment is the foregone opportunity for achievement
in the outside labor market. Hence, let uh = wh(1 − Ih) + γhV (Ih, Iw) − T and
uw = ww(1 − Iw) + γwV (Ih, Iw) + T , where each party allocates one unit of time
between domestic production and the pursuit of a career in the labor market. This
formalization captures the idea that an investment Ii has a public good component
(i.e., home production) as well as a private good component (i.e., a successful
career). Note that we may think of the magnitude of investment Ii as i’s degree
of specialization in the household sphere. The parameters wh and ww capture the
exogenously given labor market wage rates of h and w. If the couple divorce each
other at date 3, then their divorce payoffs are dh = wh(1− Ih) + µhpiV (Ih, Iw) and
dw = ww(1 − Iw) + µw(1 − pi)V (Ih, Iw). Along the lines of our baseline model, it
is easy to check that a marital surplus does exist. The Nash bargained payoffs
to the spouses at date 3 are therefore uNh = wh(1 − Ih) + θhV (Ih, Iw) and uNw =
ww(1−Iw)+θwV (Ih, Iw), where θh and θw are defined in (5) and (6). It is now easy
to verify that the investments, (Ih, Iw) , chosen at date 2 will satisfy the following
pair of first-order conditions:
θhVh(I
∗
h, I
∗
w) = wh and θwVw(I
∗
h, I
∗
w) = ww,
where the market wage rate wi represents the opportunity cost of sinking a marriage-
specific investment. Focusing on essentials we restrict attention to the following
parametric functional form for the value of the household asset: V = 2
√
Ih +
2
√
Iw. To capture the fact that the spouses may face different opportunities in the
outside labor market, we assume that wh ≥ ww. In addition, it is assumed that
the degree/extend to which party i derives utility from the asset in the regime in
which couples are separated through divorce differs between spouses. Specifically,
we assume that the less aﬄuent female partner (since ww ≤ wh) has higher divorce
valuation for the asset than the more aﬄuent male partner, i.e., µw ≥ µh.
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“Equal division approach”. This in effect calls for equal sharing.16 The un-
derlying premise of this approach is that marriage is a joint enterprise in which
the partners pool their efforts and resources towards a shared well-being, and thus
equal sharing of the couple’s assets is fair and appropriate. One advantage of equal
sharing is that it is easily understood, and thus gives clear guidelines as to likely
outcomes in the event of divorce. In our framework, it is natural to assume that a
property law based upon the principles of the equal division of property approach
is captured by piS = 1
2
. We denote the investments chosen under piS by
(
ISh , I
S
w
)
.
Since we are considering here a model where the value of the asset V takes on an
explicit functional form we obtain a very simple solution for the optimal choice of
investments for the two parties:
ISi =
[
2 (γh + γw) + µi − µj
4wi
]2
. (18)
“Compensation approach”. The basic idea here is that any assets arising from a
marriage should be allocated to the parties according to their human contributions
to the partnership. The general principle underlying this approach is that fair
account should be taken of any economic advantage derived by either spouse from
the human contributions by the other. This covers, for example, the spouse who
stays at home working in the household (or only works part-time), a wife who
supports her husband through college, or a spouse who refuses promotion so as
not to disrupt family life. In our framework, since Ih and Iw are not verifiable to
outside parties, but dIh/dwh < 0 and dIw/dww < 0, it is appealing to assume that a
property law based upon the principles of the ‘compensation approach’ is captured
by
piC =
ww
wh + ww
.
In line with the idea of compensation, this ensures that the low-wage party (i.e., the
one who will ultimately sink a relatively high marriage-specific investment) obtains
a relatively larger fraction of the asset in the event of a divorce than the high-wage
party.17 The equilibrium investments of h and w under piC are:
ICi =
[
(γh + γw) (wh + ww) + µiwj − µjwi
2wi (wh + ww)
]2
. (19)
It is easy to see that the investment incentive of the female partner will be higher
and that of the male partner will be lower under piC compared to piS, that is,
16For example, in Scotland as well as in many civil law countries and several American states,
a property regime with a statutory presumption in favor of equal division upon divorce (unless
there are special circumstances) applies to the spouses (see, e.g., Tee 2001 and Smith 2003).
17It may be noted that implementation of the compensation approach (at least in the way
that we describe it) would involve information revelation problems in a heterogeneous population
(unless the wi’s are the means for genders).
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ICw > I
S
w and I
C
h < I
S
h . The intuition for this is simple and follows from the fact
that piC translates into a bargaining advantage of the low-wage party (i.e., the wife),
which she will use to obtain more than an equal split of marriage surplus. A direct
implication of this is that w will invest more under piC compared to piS. On the
other hand, the low valuation party h, anticipating that w will “hold him up” at
the bargaining stage, will invest less under piC compared to piS.
‘Needs approach’. In England and Wales, until very recently, the predominant
discourse as to the appropriate role of property law was firmly needs based. Most
practitioners agreed that the purpose of the law in this area should be to provide
for reasonable future requirements of the former spouses. Following Tee (2001)
who argues that in a majority of cases, the requirements of the more needy (e.g.,
less aﬄuent) wife absorb most of the marital assets, it is natural to assume that
one property law based upon the principles of the ‘needs approach’ makes the less
aﬄuent party (here the wife, because ww < wh) the single owner of the asset.
Therefore we set piN = 0. The equilibrium investments under piN are:
INh =
[
(γh + γw)− µw
2wh
]2
and INw =
[
(γh + γw) + µw
2wh
]2
. (20)
The investment incentive of the female partner will be higher under piN compared
to piC , and therefore higher than under piS. The investment incentive of the male
partner will be lower under piN compared to piC , and therefore lower than under piS.
Comparing equilibrium investment levels under the different legal structures, we
obtain the following ranking of divorce asset division regimes:
Proposition 5 Assume that V (Ih, Iw) = 2
√
Ih + 2
√
Iw and let Λ ≡ wh/ww. Then
there exist critical values denoted Λ′ and Λ′′, where
Λ′ ≡ 4 (γh + γw) + µw − 3µh
4 (γh + γw)− 3µw + µh
and Λ′′ ≡ 2 (γh + γw) + µw − µh
2 (γh + γw − µw)
,
such that:
(a) if Λ > Λ′′, then the ‘needs’ approach is the best assignment of property rights,
followed by the ‘compensation’ approach, which in turn dominates ‘equal sharing’;
(b) if Λ < Λ′, then ‘equal sharing’ is the best assignment of property rights; it dom-
inates the ‘compensation’ approach, which in turn dominates the ‘needs’ approach.
(c) Otherwise, if Λ′ ≤ Λ ≤ Λ′′, then ‘equal sharing’ and the ‘needs’ model are
dominated by the ‘compensation’ approach.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the main insights of Proposition 5. It plots the ratio of extra-
household opportunities, wh/ww, against the ratio of divorce valuations, µh/µw, to
highlight the regions in which the different default asset division regimes will be
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Figure 2: An Illustration of Proposition 5.
optimal. What is clear from the figure is that the relative merit of the various le-
gal regimes depends on whether we consider societies in which the opportunities of
women outside the household differ consistently from those of men (i.e., the “gender
earnings gap”, wh−ww, is large); or whether it is the case that women have oppor-
tunities outside the household that are roughly the same as those of men (i.e., the
gap wh−ww is sufficiently narrow). It is worth highlighting the welfare implications
of the different divorce asset division regimes.
We first restrict our attention to the case where there are consistent and sub-
stantial male wage advantages, i.e., wh ≫ ww. It may appear unequal, but to the
extend that the husband has higher returns outside marriage, our two parties are
assigned to different roles within the relationship. The wife has a large marriage-
specific investment to sink that directly benefits her partner since, on the margin,
her opportunity cost is comparatively low. The husband, on the other hand, has
a comparative advantage in accumulating resources (primarily earning power) that
are valuable outside marriage. Proposition 5(a) suggests that the ‘needs’ model in
this case delivers the second-best. The intuition is that allocating sole ownership to
the female partner provides incentives for her to specialize in the household-sphere
at the optimal scale so that the net marital surplus under the ‘needs’ model is max-
imized. Any move to a sub-optimal legal structure (to either the ‘compensation’
or ‘equal division’ model) would create the behavioral risk of male opportunism,
i.e., the husband could now expropriate part of the wife’s specific investment by
threatening divorce. This would induce the female partner to start to behave de-
fensively by spending more than the optimal amount of time at work and less time
on their home (by (18) to (20)). The ‘needs’ approach is thus relevant in relation to
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women’s incentives to sink a heavy marriage-specific investment without facing the
behavioral risk of male opportunism in bargaining situations the couple encounter
throughout the partnership.
However, the case of substantial male wage advantages might be considered an
unrealistic description of some societies, and one can detect an optimal response in
the legal environment when both spouses start having sufficiently similar opportu-
nities in the outside labor market (i.e, when wh ≈ ww). In this case, the structural
positions men and women occupy within and outside marriage are much the same:
both can accumulate resources (earning power) that are valuable outside marriage
at a comparable scale. When their roles outside marriage are similar, it is desirable
to have the parties share the responsibility of undertaking marriage-specific invest-
ments. Hence it is optimal to endow both parties with balanced incentives to sink
marriage-specific investments. It is not surprising, then, that the ‘equal-splits’ or,
as the case may be, the ‘compensation’ model produces the second best marital sur-
plus (Propositions 5(b) and 5(c)). In contrast, a regime that awards sole ownership
of the asset to the female partner is the worst assignment of property rights. It may
generate a moral hazard problem insofar as it fails to provide the wife with sufficient
incentives to invest efficiently in accumulating market-compatible skills: the female
partner does too much of the unpaid household work (i.e., chooses too large a degree
of specialization in the household sphere) and spends too little time at market work
despite her facing the same opportunities in the outside labor market as the male
partner. In sum, the increasing opportunities of married women outside the house-
hold, which can be seen as an indication of women’s increasing bargaining power
within it, should be accompanied by the demise of female presumption in property
disputes and by legal changes towards “equal splits” in divorce settlements.
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Although the distributive problems of divorce may be most visible at its oc-
currence, it is increasingly understood that divorce law can also influence a broad
range of decisions in intact families — e.g., whether and when to marry, the num-
ber, timing, and upbringing of children, the allocation of resources during marriage,
and whether and when to divorce.18 Indeed, many practitioners and policy makers
often proclaim that the liberalization of divorce laws over the last thirty years has
undermined the role of marriage as an institution for providing couples with the
confidence to make long-term investments in their relationship. Yet the incentive
effects associated with alternative legal regimes are poorly understood in practice,
and no clear theoretical framework has emerged for the study of these problems.
Our main concern in this paper has been to understand why the “success” of mar-
riage can depend, in part, on the legal context in which couples decide to marry
and to stay married.
18See, e.g., Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979), Peters (1986), Cohen (1987), Gray (1998), Clark
(1999), and Chiappori et al. (2002).
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Our theoretical model shows that the terms of divorce have not only distributive
consequences ex post but can also have efficiency consequences in intact households,
by influencing spousal incentives to make investments in relationship-specific assets.
To the extent that specific investments determine the average quality of marriage,
this creates a role for the use of ex ante separation agreements that stipulate the
allocation of marital assets upon divorce. We derive several results concerning the
optimal and the equilibrium ex ante separation agreement. A fundamental principle
that governs the optimal marriage contract is to equalize the parties’ economic
positions after divorce (thereby “balancing out” spousal bargaining powers within
marriage) and to weight their investment incentives. Hence, by giving backing to
the marital bargaining process, the terms of pre-nuptial agreements prevent parties
behaving opportunistically ex post, thereby promoting efficient investment ex ante.
Several extensions and generalizations suggest themselves, some of which are
the subject of a sequel to the present paper.
• A simplifying but somewhat restrictive assumption that underlies the model
is that divorce is ruled out in equilibrium. Although many of the main qualitative
insights would be robust to allowing divorce to occur with positive probability,
it would be useful to formally address this issue partly because if the likelihood
of divorce is real then the incentives of the spouses would be altered from our
current analysis. One potential way of modelling this issue would be to impose
a positive shock to the parties’ divorce payoffs (Weiss and Willis, 1985; Clark,
1999). By incorporating such payoff uncertainty, the equilibrium divorce rate can
be determined, which, in turn, will influence and be influenced by specific marital
investments and the terms of divorce.
• A further step towards realism would be to embed the present framework
within a model of marriage markets thus endogeneizing the decision to marry. It
seems conceivable that the possibility of writing prenuptial contracts alters the
value of potential marriages between different people. It would be of great interest,
therefore, to determine how the act of writing “prenuptials” affects the choice of
spouse (Allen, 1992).
• In deriving our results we assumed that contracts contingent on marriage-
specific investments are not verifiable by third parties. A possible way to contract
on investment levels without relying on verifiability would be the posting of “marital
bonds” (Lommerud, 1989). For example, if a wife sinks a heavy marriage-specific
investment, the husband makes a monetary transfer to her. If the marriage is success
than the money is jointly used by the spouses; otherwise, if the couple divorce each
other, the wife keeps the money. It would be of interest to explore whether such
bonds can to some degree substitute for prenuptial contracts in inducing optimal
marital investments.19
19A prenuptial contract could of course not only be about the division of marrital assets, but it
could also prescribe a fine for the leaving party. However, a lump-sum fine for the leaving party
would not affect marginal returns to investing, and hence would have no effect on equilibrium
investment incentives.
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• We use the Nash bargaining solution to characterize the outcome of marital
negotiations. Alternatively, one could consider the “outside option bargaining”
protocol. Under this, if one party’s outside option is binding, then she receives her
divorce payoff while the other party receives the remaining surplus. In the light of
the work of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), it would be interesting
to study how such an alternative bargaining solution would affect our results.
• Finally, while the present model explicitly addresses the effect of holdup on
marital investment, the relational contracting literature (Halonen, 2002; Baker et
al., 2002) suggests some qualifications to our argument. The extent of holdup, for
example, will be reduced insofar as the spouses are able to punish opportunistic
behavior through the threat of non-legal sanctions. Rainer (2003) extends the
present model to allow for repeated marital investments, demonstrating that explicit
prenuptial contracts might still be used to discipline the spouses incentives to renege
on implicit relational agreements.
There are, of course, a wide range of interesting extensions to our analysis.
Despite the questions opened up by moving to a richer framework, we believe that
a model of marriage that recognizes the presence of certain transaction costs inside
the family has to be an integral part of a unified theory of marriage and divorce.
Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. Step 1 (General Characterization): The first-
order condition characterizing the optimal pi∗ is
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
=
[
∂θh
∂pi
+
∂θw
∂pi
]
V + (θw + θh)
[
Vh
∂I∗h
∂pi
+ Vw
∂I∗w
∂pi
]
− ∂I
∗
h
∂pi
− ∂I
∗
w
∂pi
. (A.1)
Since by (5) and (6)
∂θh
∂pi
+
∂θw
∂pi
= 0, (A.2)
it follows using (10) and (11) that
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
= θwVh
∂I∗h
∂pi
+ θhVw
∂I∗w
∂pi
. (A.3)
After substituting for the derivatives of the equilibrium investment levels [using
(12) and (13)], simplifying, rearranging and finally using the first-order conditions
in (10) and (11) to substitute for Vh and Vw we obtain
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
= θ3h
(
− Vw
Vww
)
− θ3w
(
− Vh
Vhh
)
. (A.4)
Step 2. Suppose that V (Ih, Iw) = (Ih)
αh (Iw)
αw where 0 < αi < 1 and αh + αw < 1.
It follows from an application of (A.4) — after substituting for the equilibrium
values of Vh, Vw, Vhh and Vww — that
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
=
θ3hI
∗
w
1− αw −
θ3wI
∗
h
1− αh . (A.5)
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After simultaneously solving the first-order conditions in (10) and (11), one obtains
the equilibrium investments
I∗h =
[
(αhθh)
1−αw (αwθw)
αw
] 1
1−αh−αw and I∗w =
[
(αhθh)
αh (αwθw)
1−αh] 11−αh−αw .
(A.6)
After combining (A.5) and (A.6), simplifying and rearranging, it follows that
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
=
αwθ
2
h
1− αw −
αhθ
2
w
1− αh (A.7)
We then obtain [using (A.7), (5) and (6)] that
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
T 0⇐⇒ − (τh + τw) [pi (µh + µw)− µw] + (τh − τw) [γh + γw] T 0. (A.8)
where τ i ≡
√
αi/(1− αi) (i = h, w). Hence, it follows that S∗ has a stationary
point at pi = pi∗ [which is stated in Proposition 2], and [after differentiating (A.7)
w.r.t to pi] that
∂2S∗(pi∗)
∂pi2
< 0.
Hence we have established that the stationary point pi = pi∗ is the point at which
S∗ achieves its maximum over the interval [0, 1]. Proposition 1 follows along the
line of this proof, taking the limiting case αh → αw. QED
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that V = αhI
η
h +αwI
η
w, where η ∈ (0, 1). From
the first-order conditions in (10) and (11) one obtains the equilibrium investments
I∗h = (ηαhθh)
1
1−η and I∗w = (ηαwθw)
1
1−η . (A.9)
It follows from an application of (A.3) — after substituting for the equilibrium
values of Vh, Vw and the derivatives of I
∗
h and I
∗
w — that
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
=
[
αηhθ
3η−2
h
] 1
1−η − [αηwθ3η−2w ] 11−η . (A.10)
We then obtain [using (A.10), (5) and (6)] that
∂S∗(pi)
∂pi
T 0⇐⇒ − (τ̂h + τ̂w) [pi (µh + µw)− µw]+(τ̂h − τ̂w) [γh + γw] T 0. (A.11)
where τ̂ i = α
1
2−3η
i (i = h, w). Hence, it follows that S
∗ has a stationary point at
pi = pi∗ [which is stated in Proposition 3(a)], and [after differentiating (A.10) w.r.t
to pi] that
∂2S∗(pi∗)
∂pi2
S 0⇐⇒ η S 2
3
.
Hence we have established that if η < 2
3
(if η > 2
3
), then the stationary point pi = pi∗
is the point at which S∗ achieves a maximum (minimum) over the interval [0, 1].
QED
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Proof of Proposition 4. The proposition concerns the players’ choices between
the optimal pi∗ and an arbitrary pi0 ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that V = I1/3h I1/3w . The optimal
division rule in this case is pi∗ = µw/ (µh + µw). Player i’s (i = h, w) equilibrium
payoff from the relationship when pi∗ = µw/ (µh + µw) would be:
20
uh (pi
∗) = 2
[(
θ∗i
3
)2(θ∗j
3
)]
=
2
27
[(
γh + γw
2
)3]
.
Player i’s (i = h, w) equilibrium payoff from the relationship when pi = pi0 would
be:
ui
(
pi0
)
= 2
[(
θ0i
3
)2(
θ0j
3
)]
(i 6= j) ,
where θ0i (i = h, w) is as in (5) and (6), but with pi replaced by pi
0. Now define
ϕh (pi
0) ≡ uh (pi∗)−uh (pi0) and ϕw (pi0) ≡ uw (pi∗)−uw (pi0). After setting ϕh (pi0) =
ϕw (pi
0) = 0 and some simplification, it follows that
ϕh
(
pi0
)
= 0⇐⇒ (pi∗ − pi0) [−µ2 (pi0)2 + µ (2µw − γ) pi0 + γ (µw + γ)− µ2w] = 0
and
ϕw
(
pi0
)
= 0⇐⇒ (pi∗ − pi0) [µ2 (pi0)2 − µ (2µw + γ)pi0 + γ (µw − γ) + µ2w] = 0,
where γ = γh + γw, µ = µh + µw and pi
∗ = µw/ (µh + µw). It is now easy to show
that pi∗ and pˆi0h [which is stated in the proposition] are the two unique values of pi
0
over the interval [0, 1] such that ϕh (pi
0) = 0. Similarly, it is readily checked that pi∗
and pˆi0w [which is stated in the proposition] are the two unique values of pi
0 over the
interval [0, 1] such that ϕw (pi
0) = 0. We then note that
∂ϕh (pi
∗)
∂pi0
< 0 and
∂ϕh
(
pˆi0h
)
∂pi0
> 0.
This implies that for any pi0 ∈ [0, pi∗) ∪ (pˆi0h, 0], player h would prefer pi∗ over pi0 ,
while for any pi0 ∈ [pi∗, pˆi0h] player h would prefer pi0 over pi∗. We also note that
∂ϕw
(
pˆi0w
)
∂pi0
< 0 and
∂ϕw (pi
∗)
∂pi0
> 0.
This implies that for any pi0 ∈ [0, pˆi0w) ∪ (pi∗, 1] player w would prefer pi∗ over pi0,
while for any pi0 ∈ [pˆi0w, pi∗] player w would prefer pi0 over pi∗. The proposition
now follows immediately since pi∗ is jointly preferred by h and w for any pi0 ∈[
0, pˆi0w
) ∪ (pˆi0h, 1].QED
20Recall that pi∗ = µh/ (µh + µw) is the unique value of pi such that θh = θw.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that V = 2
√
Ih + 2
√
Iw, let Λ ≡ wh/ww, and
restrict attention to parameters satisfying wh ≥ ww and µw ≥ µh. Then the joint
net marital surplus for an arbitrary pik ∈ {piN , piC , piS} would be:
S
(
pik
)
= wh
[
1−
(
θkh
wh
)2]
+ ww
[
1−
(
θkh
wh
)2]
+ 2 (γh + γw)
[
θkh
wh
+
θkw
ww
]
,
where θki (i = h, w) is as in (5) and (6), but with pi replaced by pi
k ∈ {piN , piC , piS}.
After subtracting S
(
piC
)
from S
(
piN
)
, simplifying and re-arranging, it follows that
S
(
piN
)− S (piC) T 0⇐⇒ Λ T 2 (γh + γw)− (θNh + θCh )
2 (γh + γw)−
(
θNw + θ
C
w
)
After substituting piN = 0 and piC = 1/ (1 + Λ) into (5) and (6) to obtain θNh and
θCh respectively, re-arranging and simplifying, it follows that
S
(
piN
)− S (piC) T 0⇐⇒ 2 (γh + γw) (Λ− 1) + µh T µw (2Λ + 1)
Hence, it follows that there exists a critical value Λ′′ [which is stated in Proposition
4] such that S
(
piN
)− S (piC) T 0⇐⇒ Λ T Λ′′.
After subtracting S
(
piC
)
from S
(
piS
)
, simplifying and re-arranging, it follows
that
S
(
piS
)− S (piC) T 0⇐⇒ Λ T 2 (γh + γw)− (θSh + θCh )
2 (γh + γw)−
(
θSw + θ
C
w
)
After substituting piS = 1
2
and piC = 1/ (1 + Λ) into (5) and (6) to obtain θSh and
θCh respectively, re-arranging and simplifying, it follows that
S
(
piS
)− S (piC) T 0⇐⇒ 4 (γh + γw) (Λ− 1) + µh (Λ + 3) S µw (3Λ + 1)
Hence, it follows that there exists a critical value Λ′ [which is stated in Proposition
4] such that S
(
piS
)−S (piC) T 0⇐⇒ Λ S Λ′. The proposition follows immediately.
QED
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